By the turn of the twentieth century, the Qing court sought to incorporate and homogenise its imperial periphery. This shift towards firmer control of its Mongolian borderlands with neighbouring Russia elicited anti-imperial sentiments among the indigenous population.
As early as 1908, Russian authorities in Harbin, the administrative centre of Russian Manchuria, had proposed granting asylum in Transbaikalia to Tokhtogo and his supporters.
After lengthy debates among the Ministries of War and of Foreign Affairs, and almost two years of secret negotiations with Tokhtogo, the partisan agreed, accepting the precondition that Russia would grant him asylum only if he crossed the border without any open help. In the spring of 1910, Russian officials meticulously prepared the flight. His middleman received explicit instructions and documents from the Russian General Consul in Harbin, as Russian officials knew that China would try to hamper the escape. They identified a suitable place in Khalkha where the Mongol group could pass the border without notice (GAChO, Voennyi Gubernator Zabaikal'skoi oblasti 14.1.1910) . In order to deceive Tokhtogo's Chinese persecutors, the Russian border commissioner of Kiakhta spread rumours among local Mongols that Tokhtogo was in hiding in a remote area of Mongolia, far from the Russian border (GAChO, Kiakhtinskii Pogranichnyi Komissar 31.3.1910) .
In spite of these efforts, the conspiracy failed. In April 1910, about 80 Chinese soldiers from an Urga battalion attacked Tokhtogo and his comrades in Tsetsenkhan aimak of Khalkha region the night before they crossed the border. Tokhtogo's men killed 31 Chinese during the fight and took six hostages, executing them after interrogation. According to his own account, Tokhtogo lost just two men in action, one of them his son. In the end, Tokhtogo entered Russian territory with 47 male Mongolian comrades, weapons, and more than 200 horses. Yet the plan to hide the secret hideaway of the Mongolian rebel had failed (Tokhtogo 1910: 216 - see historical supplement, this volume; 'Uchenie Tokhtokho-Taizhi' / 'The teachings of chieftain Tokhtogo', Zabaikal'skaia nov' [Transbaikal News] 12.6.1910 (25.6.1910 .
A heated correspondence between Chinese and Russian diplomats and provincial authorities followed the coup. The Chinese imperial resident of Hulunbeir demanded that the Russians detain and deport the Mongolian insurrectionist (GAChO, Hulunbeir Amban 1910) . But the Russian Military Governor of Transbaikalia refused to hold diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese imperial resident of Hulunbeir. Instead, he reiterated the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which classified the Mongol not as an ordinary criminal fugitive (who would have to be extradited) but rather as a political refugee (GAChO, Voennyi Gubernator Zabaikal'skoi oblasti 17.7.1910; RGIA, Upravliaiushchii Ministerstvom Inostrannykh Del 16.4.1910) . In early June 1910, rumours circulated that in pursuing Tokhtogo about 1000 Chinese soldiers had passed Lake Dalai and approached Khalkha. In addition, about 800 banner troops of Tsetsenkhan aimak were said to have been mobilised, supported by 100 Chinese soldiers from Urga for protection in the event of Tokhtogo's return ('V poiskakh Tokhtokho' / 'In search of Tokhtogo', Zabaikal'skaia nov', 3.6.1910 (16.6.1910 . At the same time, the Chinese were said to have sent spies to Transbaikalia to neutralise his escape to Russian territory. The Russian border commissioner of Kiakhta claimed to know the whereabouts of at least two Chinese spies who were in search of Tokhtogo. He described these 'tourists' to the Military Governor of Transbaikalia as people 'dressed in ragged Mongol garments; that is the usual Chinese way of espionage disguise in poverty, feigning an idiot' (GAChO, Kiakhtinskii Pogranichnyi Komissar 23.6.1910 ).
But in Russia, Tokhtogo and his men were relatively safe at last. After the flight, the everyday lives of the rebels underwent significant change. One of Tokhtogo's companions told a journalist writing for the Chita newspaper Zabaikal'skaia nov ' in 1910: For several years, we have attacked the Chinese in revenge for what they had done to us by plundering us and abducting our wives and children. We have never touched a single Mongol. The Chinese authorities have more than once attempted to detain us, and several times we were even surrounded by them, but we were able to escape and harm them. […] We are accustomed to the harsh life. Our main chieftain Tokhtogo [Tokhtokho-taizha] , […] speaks to us every day and suggests behaving modestly and living at peace with the population, not offending or insulting anyone. In other words, he makes us forget our previous military life. We endorse his teachings and wholly subscribe to them. ('Uchenie Tokhtokho-Taizhi' / 'The teachings of chieftain Tokhtogo', Zabaikal'skaia nov' 12.6.1910 (29.6.1910 Thus, even before Khalha and Hulunbeir had declared independence, the Russian press celebrated the noble savage.
Despite the value of Tokhtogo and his refugees to the Russian government, the slow mills of Russian bureaucracy delayed aid to them. For more than a year, the men camped in yurts on a temporarily assigned spot in Western Transbaikalia, far away from Hulunbeir. Economic circumstances forced them to sell 50 of their 200 horses, undermining Tokhtogo's authority among his subordinates. Only in July 1911 were Tokhtogo and his followers naturalised as Russians and given an allowance of 13,500 rubles. They were further assigned about 1635 hectares of land in the Aga Steppe, near the Hulunbeir border, where eventually they were assimilated into the indigenous Buriat Cossacks roaming the territory (GAChO, Voennyi Gubernator Zabaikal'skoi oblasti 5.12.1910 and RGVIA, Voennyi Gubernator Zabaikal'skoi oblasti 6.6.1911: 47; RGVIA, Voiskovoi shtab Zabaikal'skogo Kazach'ego voiska 7.6.1911; RGVIA, Ustroistvo July 1911) . In the Aga Steppe, the pacified rebel became, almost, an ordinary herder again, a fighter only in waiting.
The rebel for an independent Mongol state had been courted and supported by the Russian authorities early on. In retrospect, his attempt to fight against Han-Chinese colonisation and the Qing 'New Policies' provided significant impetus for the indigenous population of Hulunbeir and its neighbouring territories to do the same. Therefore, Tokhtogo's story is emblematic of two themes: it showcases the resistance of the peripheral indigenous population to Chinese imperial policies; and at the same time, it reveals how the Russian empire attempted to spur on this insurgency in order to gain indirect control over Chinese borderland areas such as Hulunbeir. In sum, St Petersburg granted asylum to a negligible rebel, not out of altruism but from clear self-interest. As far as the indigenous insurgent was concerned, however, with respect to conflicting notions of territory and border, his allegiance was still to the ethnic community rather than the Russian empire. Tokhtogo thus embodies the type of 'detachable men' that were were caught between two competing empires both regarding him as their subject. 'Detachable people' could fall victim to conflicting allegiances, one of which in Tokhtogo's case was his dependence on Russia as external power while the other was the link to his own group of followers. Khutukhtu's bodyguards, was not allowed to participate (LOC, Lattimore (undated): 8; Lan 1996: 234) . Though revolt also broke out in Inner Mongolian bannerlands, these territories were already too closely interwoven with the Chinese provinces to furnish the secular or ecclesiastical leaders who would be able to unify the indigenous people for a common political cause. In the end, Chinese Republican forces succeeded in suppressing the secessionist tendencies in those banners.
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Through an extensive network of informants, the Russian authorities stayed well informed about major developments in this rebellion. The first general assembly of influential Hulunbeir tribal leaders was held in September 1911 -weeks before the Wuchang Uprising erupted on 10 October. The banner leaders protested against their disempowerment and requested the Chinese authorities to remove Chinese officials, to reintroduce autonomous regional administration, to pull out all Chinese troops, and to stop Han colonisation. During a second congress in November 1911, it was decided, in obedience to orders from Urga, to proceed with the formation of troops for the purpose of fomenting open rebellion. The first day of the revolt was scheduled for 2 (15) December 1911 (Baranov 1912: 55-6; Men'shikov 1917: 37-8; Woodhead 1914: 622; RGIA, Shtab 1912: 62-62 obl.; Meshcherskii 1920: 5-6 
OPAQUE ENTANGLEMENTS: RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE REVOLT
Weeks before the Chinese defeat at Lubinfu, the Russian government was well aware of the looming insurrection. It reacted swiftly. As early as late 1911, St Petersburg increased its troop presence east of Lake Baikal. Two divisions were deployed at various railroad stations in Transbaikalia to protect Russian interests in North Manchuria and to regain full control over the Chinese Eastern Railroad line. About 3000 railroad carriages were being held in reserve at Manzhouli, fitted to accommodate 40 soldiers each, so as to transport up to 120,000 men at very short notice (NARA, Maynard 24.11.1911: 40 and 19.12.1911: 47) . The American doctor sent a long list of further evidence to the US Consul, painting a scene in which Mongols followed Russian instructions, firing from Russian-controlled railroad territory, waiting there in reserve, and finally returning weapons to the Russians after the Dumy Zabaikal'ia, 3.4.1912 (16.4.1912 : 2).
The US consul in Harbin reported that
[…] the principal buildings being entirely destroyed by fire, and the Chinese population, being subjected to great suffering and sustaining heavy losses […] were in a panic, and tried to escape from the town, yet 600 Chinese were captured by the Mongols who apparently intended to hold them for ransom.
The authorities were helpless, and looting continued. The only things being saved were articles that the owners managed to take to the Russian part of the town.
Observers debated whether the total anarchy had been prompted by political or patriotic reasons, or whether a mutiny sparked by Mongolian soldiers who had not been paid set off the riots. In any case, the morning after the riots, Russian authorities pressured the Mongolian administration to restore order (NARA, Maynard 13.4.1912: 90) .
Thus, while Russia had been reluctant to get involved too closely in Inner Mongolia for fear of Japanese reaction, the tsarist empire was willing to become involved in Hulunbeir.
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Backed by the Russian military, the Mongols had succeeded in taking control of the borderland. At first glance, the imperial borderland had been restored to independence. For the nomads still roaming the region, however, the future was less certain than ever. (Paine 1996: 295-8; Woodhead 1914: 633-5 (RGIA, Shtab 25.11.1913 and 22.3.1914) . When we struggled for autonomy with weapons in our hands, we were convinced to unite with independent Khalkha, and the Russian government pledged to fully support us. Now it has become evident that the Russian government has broken its promises, putting us in a difficult position. If we do not take our fate in our hands now, our enemies will wipe us out.
[…]
Wouldn't it be better to accept Chinese authority right away instead of resisting and shedding our blood in vain?
With a military force of fewer than 3000 poorly trained and inadequately equipped soldiers, no one was really in the mood for fighting. Nonetheless the gathering ended without a satisfactory resolution (RGIA, Shtab 20.4.1914 : quotation on 155-155 obl.; 'Khailar' / 'Hailar', Zabaikal'skaia nov ', 19.4.1914 (2.5.1914 ): 3).
THE CALL FOR INDEPENDENCE SLOWLY FADES: THE STATUS OF HULUNBEIR AFTER 1915
Russia's policy towards Mongolia following independence had been realistic and prudent, reflecting the different lights in which imperial officials saw Outer Mongolia and Hulunbeir.
For Outer Mongolia, policymakers in St Petersburg sought to preserve some degree of administrative autonomy, to prevent Chinese military deployment and colonisation, and to obtain special economic interests and rights for Russia. The ultimate goal in the long run was to exclude Outer Mongolia from China's sphere of interest, thereby creating a buffer state.
According to this policy, Outer Mongolia was granted a quasi-independent status in which it remained under both Chinese control and Russian protection, a decision born of international pressures at a tripartite conference of Russia, China and Mongolia in Kiakhta on 7 June 1915. 25 To Russian observers, the politically immature princes at Urga were mere puppets in a 'Great Game' between Japan, Russia and China. Russia's main concern had been the creation of a buffer state to prevent China from building up military forces at the border. A unified 87-90). 27 The agreement also marked a serious setback for the indigenous struggle for selfrule. Just as the Russian authorities had forgotten about Tokhtogo as soon as he had lost his possible strategic value for them, the voices of Hulunbeir's indigenous inhabitants had been heard only insofar as they served imperial needs.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that, despite the settlement exluding Hulunbeir from autonomous Outer Mongolia, the fight for independence from Chinese rule continued there after 1915.
Probably the most prominent figure in that struggle was Babuzhaba. 28 Born in 1875, he had been paramount in the revolt of the Kharachins, a sub-ethnic group in eastern Inner Mongolia.
Babuzhaba's freedom struggles gained more attention from contemporaries and historians (Meshcherskii 1920: 7-12; 'Khailar 12 maia' / 'Hailar, May 12th', Kharbinskii vestnik, 25.5.1917 (7.6.1917 Mongols thus retained a distinctive structure of local government (Kormazov 1928: 59-62; Baranov 1926: 23-6 (Atwood 2002: vol. 2, 844-853, 861-887) . It would be the last flickering of an indigenous resistance in the Hulunbeir borderlands to gain even a modicum of support from the Soviet Union, to be understood by the latter as a blow against Chinese rule.
In the assessment of Owen Lattimore, in his time a leading scholar of Inner Asia, by the late 1920s the 'more or less unreal and romantic nationalism' of Inner Mongolia was in decline:
The question is no longer one of degrees of autonomy or nominal independence within rival Russian, Japanese and Chinese spheres of influence.
On the economic side there is only the question of the presence or absence of colonial exploitation; on the political side, the degree of social revolution or counterrevolution. (Lattimore 1936: 405) Developments 
NOTES
1 The territories, totalling about 729,000 sq. km, were annexed on the basis of two highly advantageous border treaties, those of Aigun and Beijing, concluded in 1858 and 1860 (Paine 1996: 28-106 passim) .
2 Also referred to as 'New Administration'. This set of radical initiatives (including military modernisation, reorganisation of the central bureaucracy and centralisation of power, promotion of modern education, investment in infrastructure), collectively known as the 'New Policy' reforms, was nothing less than an attempted revolution from above. The reform period (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) ) marked a watershed in the transformation of the Chinese state into something recognisably modern. On the Qing official reform programme, see e.g. Ichiko (1980: 375-415) . For the comparison of the 'success' of the 'New Policy' in Inner Mongolia and its failure in Outer Mongolia, see e.g. Lan (1999: 42-9 Paine (1996: 178-94); and Urbansky (2008: 38-41) . 5 For the opening of bannerland in Jirim league, see Baranov (1919: 42-3); and Lan (1996: 72-3). 6 For the impact of the Boxer Uprising in the region, see Orlov (1901: 3-35 Paine (1996: 287-95 ).
12 For answers to the question of why Inner Mongolian banners never proclaimed independence or attempts to become independent failed, see Lan (1999: 52-3; 1996: 152-64 ', Dumy Zabaikal'ia, 12.1.1912 (25.1.1912 : 2).
Other Russian observers estimated the number of Chinese soldiers to be 400 and the number of Mongol troops at 900 (RGIA, Russo-Asiatic Bank 1912: 6-7). 17 Peter Tang speaks of a 'strong Russian assistance' in seizing both Hailar and Manzhouli without supporting this claim with substantial proof (Tang 1959: 83) . 18 The customs commissioner Baron von Seckendorff reported that the Mongols withdrew from the neighbourhood after they had dismantled some of the buildings at Lubinfu and sold the loot (NARA, Maynard 15.2.1912: 71) . Hulunbeir (Paine 1996: 272-6) . For the entire agreement text, see Woodhead (1914: 630-33) . 20 The same holds true for candid discussions on the possible future status of Outer Mongolia, e.g. Denisov (1913: 124-31) and Baranov (1919: 43-6) . 21 Located on Chinese territory but within the extra-territorial zone of the railroad, Manzhouli and parts of Hailar were under de facto Russian control. Russian authority, however, was undermined after the Russo-Japanese War, when both places became treaty ports, i.e. places bound by treaty to be open to foreign trade. Foreign residents thus enjoyed privileges of extraterritoriality just as they did in other treaty ports in China. 22 According to the pre-reform administrative structure in which a local (and not a HanChinese governor, daotai) acted as imperial resident (amban). See note 14 for explanation. 23 The critical question of China's borders, i.e. whether the ethnic frontiers should be allowed to decide their own fate, was widely debated among scholars in Republican China. The position of the Chinese state, however, was a minority viewpoint, as many feared that the loss of the frontier territories would threaten the Chinese core by increasing its vulnerability to the Great Powers (Esherick 2006: 233-8, 243-8) . 24 Solons, Barga-Chipchin and Dagurs were referred to as 'Old Bargut' as they had been relocated to Hulunbeir to start patrolling the border with Russia. The others were called 'New Bargut', since they arrived in Hulunbeir only after 1735. 25 According to the eleventh article of the treaty, Hulunbeir remained outside the scope of autonomous Outer Mongolia. On the outcomes of this conference, see Lan (1996: 209-18 ); Nakami (1999: 75-6 ); Paine (1996: 298-305) . 26 See note 14 for explanation. 27 The entire agreement is published in Hulunbei'er gaiyao (1930: 59-63) .
28 Also referred to as Babuujab. 29 On the resistance of Babuzhaba in the years 1902 to 1917, see Lan (1996: 239-49) (Elleman 1993: 539-63; Paine 1996: 314-42) . 31 The most detailed account of the history of the revolutionary movement in Inner Mongolia during the 1920s, drawing on Mongolian archives but largely understating the international framework of China, the Soviet Union and Japan, is the two-volume work by Atwood (2002) .
For the independence movement in Inner Mongolia during the late 1920s to mid 1930s and its relations with Moscow and Nanjing, see Bulag (2006: 268-71, 279-87) .
